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Do as the Romans do: On the authoritarian roots of pseudoscience 
 
 
Abstract: Recent research highlights the implications of group dynamics in the 
acceptance and promotion of misconceptions, particularly in relation to the identity-
protective attitudes that boost polarisation over scientific information. In this study we 
successfully test a mediational model between right-wing authoritarianism and 
pseudoscientific beliefs. Firstly, we carry out a comprehensive literature review on the 
socio-political background of pseudoscientific beliefs. Secondly, we conduct two 
studies (n = 1189 and n = 1097) to confirm our working hypotheses: H-1 — 
intercorrelation between pseudoscientific beliefs, authoritarianism, and three axioms 
(reward for application, religiosity, and fate control); H-2 — authoritarianism and social 
axioms fully explain rightists’ proneness to pseudoscience; and H-3 — the association 
between pseudoscience and authoritarianism is partially mediated by social axioms. 
Lastly, we discuss our results in relation to their external validity regarding paranormal 
and conspiracy beliefs, as well as to their implications for group polarisation and 
science communication. 






Human cognition has proven to be strongly influenced by group dynamics that 
often involve uncritical practices, such as conventionalism, disinformation, and fact 
resistance, which characterise social epistemology as a fragile process. Current social 
polarisation, and the consequent strengthen of these collective uncritical inclinations 
(Kreiss, 2018), has given rise to a cultural landscape in which unfounded beliefs thrive. 
Accordingly, the personalised access to the world (Pariser, 2011) that determines the 
prevailing post-truth situation (Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017) has reinforced the 
prominence of evidence-resistant groups within the public sphere — particularly, by 
means of echo-chambers of information and the affective feedback loop of social media 
(Boler & Davis, 2018). So, current belief polarisation is not merely a misinformation 
issue; instead, it is better described as a clash of irreconcilable “alternative 
epistemologies” that express ingroup systems of beliefs (Lewandowsky, Ecker, and 
Cook, 2017). 
Pseudoscientific beliefs such as intelligent design, climate change denial, 
homeopathy, German new medicine, morphic fields, quantum quackery, repressed 
memories, magnet therapy, HIV/AIDS denialism, antipsychiatry, parapsychology, body 
memory, and the anti-vaccination movement (for more instances see Fasce & Picó, 
2019a) are fundamentally characterized as lacking in epistemic warrant — defined as 
"the totality of evidence and knowledge that is available to human knowledge seekers at 
the time in question" (Hansson, 2009, p. 239) — and classified in two groups: pseudo-
theory promotion and science denialism (Fasce & Picó, 2019a). In addition to its basic 
lack of epistemic warrant, shared with other validated types of unfounded beliefs (such 
as paranormal and conspiracy theories), pseudoscience shows the distinctive peculiarity 
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of being presented to the public with the trappings of science (Blancke, Boudry, & 
Pigliucci, 2017). 
This study investigates the kind of cultural inputs — worldviews, ideologies, and 
social attitudes — that suppress the perception of expert consensus over 
pseudoscientific claims, promoting the acceptance of these deviant doctrines as a badge 
of ingroup membership and, consequently, motivated reasoning. Accordingly, we aid 
understanding about the social acceptance and promotion of alternative epistemologies 
— more specifically, about the kind of interpretations of the social world that are related 
to the adoption of pseudoscientific beliefs. 
  
Socio-political sources of motivation for pseudoscience 
  
Pseudoscientific claims have been profusely investigated from a cognitive 
perspective — for example, regarding their close relationship with intuitive cognitive 
style (Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012), causal illusions (Matute, 
Yarritu, & Vadillo, 2011), and pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity (Pennycook, 
Cheyne, Barr, Koegler & Fugelsang, 2015). Additionally, there is a growing corpus of 
research outcomes on their ideological and political dimensions that has flourished 
within the “politically motivated reasoning paradigm” (Kahan, 2016). The effect of 
minority but influential forms of motivated reasoning elicited by socio-political 
worldviews (e.g. Palm, Lewis, & Fend, 2017) is enlightening regarding the recalcitrant 
nature of certain pseudoscientific beliefs: it makes individuals exposed to information 
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more polarised than non-exposed ones (e.g. Nyhan, Reifler, Richey, & Freed, 2014; 
Nyhan & Reifler, 2015; Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016; Palm, Lewis, & Fend, 2017), 
gives rise to backfire effect (e.g. Nyhan, Reifler, Richey, & Freed, 2014; Nyhan & 
Reifler, 2015), and turns analytical thinking into a polarising factor (e.g. Kahan, 2013). 
Nevertheless, despite this robust and growing set of research outcomes, group dynamics 
that underlie this form of politically motivated reasoning are scarcely known. 
Recent research on the epidemiology of pseudoscience (e.g. Lewandowsky, Cook, 
Fay, & Gignac, 2019) suggests that identity-protective cognition related to ingroup 
systems of beliefs, norms, and values breaks out when pseudoscientific believers get 
organized as deviant “communities of knowledge” (Sloman & Fernbach, 2016). These 
intergroup struggles would foster perceived threat and uncertainty, which would 
motivate group identification to boost self-affirmation and uncertainty reduction (Hogg 
& Wagoner, 2017). Consequently, prior studies have shown that conspiracy theories 
have a distinctive quadratic relationship with the political spectrum, thus showing 
associations with general political extremism and dogmatic intolerance elicited by 
strong beliefs (van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015) — there is evidence of 
homogeneity regarding certain cognitive processes between left-wing and right-wing 
extremists, for example authoritarianism (Conway, Houck, Gornick, & Repke, 2017; 
Luttig, 2017) and motivated reasoning (Kahan, 2013; Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 
2016). 
In contrast, the relation between pseudoscience and the political spectrum remains 
controversial: although there is a confirmed relationship between conservatism and 
some instances of science denial, such as climate change denial (e.g. Hornsey, Harris, 
Brain, & Fielding, 2016), other instances, such as GMO opposition, do not show 
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distinctive political associations (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013). Despite 
no prior study has measured the political orientation of pseudoscientific beliefs as a 
comprehensive construct, it is expect to show a rightward cast by means of greater 
proneness to conformity, desire to share reality with like-minded others, and ideological 
echo-chambers among political conservatives (Jost, van der Linden, Panagopoulos, & 
Hardin, 2018). Further theoretical justification for this expected rightward cast of 
pseudoscience will be detailed in the following sections. 
  
An authoritarian interpretation of society: the role of conventionalism and 
intellectual submission 
  
Authoritarianism is a long-established psychological construct, closely related to 
partisan extremism driven by group-centric affective polarisation (Luttig, 2017). It 
emerges from fears and uncertainties that give rise to motivated social cognition in 
which authoritarian attitudes reinforce conformity over social issues (Feldman, 2003), 
and satisfies epistemic, existential, and ideological needs (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & 
Sulloway, 2003). Hence, it should be interpreted as a behavioural expression of values 
that motivates subjects in attaining collective security to the detriment of individual 
autonomy and critical thinking (Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010). 
The work of Altemeyer (1981) was momentous due to his robust 
multidimensional model of authoritarianism, in which the construct is composed of 
three factors. Firstly, Aggression refers to the disposition to intentionally harm (in 
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psychological, physical or social terms) other individuals or outgroups that are 
perceived as a threat, accompanied by "the belief that proper authority approves it or 
that it will help preserve such authority" (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 10). Secondly, 
Submission refers to the belief that “proper authorities should be trusted to a great extent 
and deserve obedience and respect” (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 9). Accordingly, it boosts the 
willingness to accept authority's statements and actions without critical assessment. 
Thirdly, Conventionalism refers to a “strong acceptance of and commitment to the 
traditional social norms in one's society” (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 10). These factors lead 
individuals to fervently endorse ingroup conventions as social imperatives that must be 
respected — an inflexible conception of social norms that leads them to reject 
outgroups' conventions, including their beliefs and values. 
Prior research has shown perceived social consensus as a source of motivation for 
facts assessment. So, individuals tend to accept or reject information depending on 
whether or not it fits with ingroup values and beliefs (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 
2010; Lewandowsky, Cook, Fay, & Gignac, 2019), as a way to achieve short-term 
social benefits (Khanna & Sood, 2017). Accordingly, some cases of denialism show a 
striking “consensus-gap” between experts and the public opinion (Lewandowsky, 
Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013) and perceived group consensus mediates science acceptance 
on pseudoscientific issues (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015; 
Lewandowsky, Cook, Fay, & Gignac, 2019). Therefore, authoritarian predispositions 
may increase consensus-gap through an increment of radicalism over ingroup identity-
related conventions and authorities. 
We consider this potential effect of authoritarianism over consensus-gap to be 
explicable by means of the lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, Orehek, Dechesne, & 
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Pierro, 2010). Specifically, by means of heightened levels of two of its dimensions: 
epistemic motivation for non-specific closure (elicited by authoritarian 
conventionalism) and hyperactive search for epistemic authorities within one's reference 
group (elicited by authoritarian submission). There is a strong relationship between 
authoritarianism and need for closure (De Keersmaecker, Roets, Dhont, Van Assche, 
Onraet, & Van Hiel, 2017) that motivates subjects to close their minds by “seizing” on 
accommodating information and “freezing” beliefs, thus becoming impervious to 
adverse data (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Group centrism — i.e. the degree to which 
individuals strive to enhance the “shared-reality” of their collectivity (Kruglanski, 
Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006) — involves uniformity pressures, such as 
denigrating the dissenters or extolling the conformists, in order to achieve group 
consensus (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991). 
This motivated group centrism manifests a preference for opinions that are 
unlikely to be challenged by significant others, as it would facilitate their esteem and 
appreciation, as well as the conservation of ingroup ties and social identity. Moreover, 
group centrism leads individuals to prefer autocratic group structures wherein a 
centralized authority shields commonly shared opinions (e.g. Pierro, Mannetti, De 
Grada, Livi, & Kruglanski, 2003). In sum, there are robust reasons to hypothesise that 
authoritarianism functions as a cognitive framework that hinders the evidential aspect of 





Social axioms as socio-psychological backgrounds that foster the authoritarian 
dimension of pseudoscience 
  
Social axioms constitute a promising cross-cultural variable to aid understanding 
of the socio-psychological profile of pseudoscientific believers beyond their distribution 
in the right-wing/left-wing political spectrum. The construct is defined by Leung and 
Bond (2008) as “generalized beliefs about people, social groups, social institutions, the 
physical environment, or the spiritual world as well as about categories of events and 
phenomena in the social world” (p. 10). Social axioms express how society is believed 
to work through perceived correlational or causal patterns that constitute the basic 
premises which people endorse and rely upon to make sense of life in society and to 
guide their actions. In this respect, they differ in several ways from other related 
constructs such as personality factors (Chen, Bond, & Cheung, 2006; Leung, Lam, 
Bond, Conway, Gornick, & Amponsah, et al. 2012) and values — such as Hofstede's 
cultural dimensions, Schwartz's values, and cultural worldviews (Leung, Au, Kurman, 
Niit, & Niit, 2007). 
Social axioms are encoded in the form of an assertion about the relationship 
between two entities or concepts, whereas values describe axiological reasoning and 
subjective desires; for example, a statement like "wars are bad" reflects a pacifist value, 
while statements such as "powerful people tend to exploit others" are regarded as social 
axioms due to the specified relationship between the entities, independent of its positive 
or negative social evaluation (Leung & Bond, 2008). The conceptual differences 
between social axioms and personality factors are even more explicit, as personality 
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also encompasses attitudes, temperament, values, and feelings. In effect, social axioms 
have shown greater predictive power than personality traits and values in relation to 
social behaviour (Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, & Chemonges‐Nielson, 2004), as they 
represent a practical guide to interpret societal functioning in a broad range of contexts. 
Five social axioms with cross-cultural validity and psychometric soundness have 
been reported (Leung, Lam, Bond, Conway, Gornick, & Amponsah, et al. 2012): 
Social Cynicism — negative beliefs about human nature, a biased view against 
some groups of people, mistrust of social institutions, and a belief that people disregard 
ethical means in achieving their ends. For example, “kind-hearted people are easily 
bullied” and “the only way to get ahead is to take advantage of others”. 
Reward for Application — effort, careful planning, and a belief that the 
investment of these and other resources will lead to positive social outcomes. Two 
sample items of this axiom are “hard-working people are well rewarded” and “difficult 
problems can be overcome by hard work and persistence”. 
Fate Control — a belief that life events are determined by external forces, but 
there are some ways for people to influence the impact of these forces. “Fate determines 
one’s successes and failures” and “the people whom a person will love in his or her life 
are determined by fate” are beliefs framed within this axiom. 
Social Complexity — a belief that behaviour is inconsistent from situation to 
situation and that there may be multiple ways of achieving a given outcome. For 
instance, “there is usually more than one good way to handle a situation” and “people 
may have opposite behaviors on different occasions”. 
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Religiosity — a belief in the beneficial social functions of religious institutions 
and practices. Statements such as “religion helps people make good choices for their 
lives” and “religion makes people happier” characterise this social axiom. 
Current literature on social axioms has found that three of them (Reward for 
Application, Religiosity and Fate Control) are positively related to authoritarianism, 
whereas Social Complexity and Social Cynicism are unrelated (Fasce & Avendaño, 
2020). In this study, we expect an analogous pattern regarding pseudoscience. 
Religiosity 
Religiosity has been already linked to unwarranted beliefs (Singelis, Hubbard, 
Her, & An, 2003) and to social conservatism (Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, & Chemonges‐
Nielson, 2004). Moreover, the relationship between authoritarian predisposition and 
normative religious doctrines has been widely documented (e.g. Van Pachterbeke, 
Freyer & Saroglou, 2011). Moreover, believing in the positive impact of religion among 
society — for example, over health issues, political decision-making, and ethics — 
involves a lenient attitude towards unwarranted beliefs, as some alternative 
epistemologies are perceived by these subjects as socially desirable. 
Fate control 
Fate Control has also been associated with social conservatism, to the 
endorsement of traditionalism (Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, & Chemonges‐Nielson, 2004; 
Leung, Au, Huang, Kurman, Niit, & Niit, 2007), and to unfounded beliefs (Singelis, 
Hubbard, Her, & An, 2003). Hence, this social axiom may be closely linked to the 
conventionalism dimension of authoritarianism. Fate control could also be related to 
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pseudoscience by means of its existing association with an external locus of control 
(Chen, Bond, & Cheung, 2006), and with a conception of facts as shaped by social and 
political processes (Garrett & Weeks, 2017). 
Reward for Application 
Reward for Application has been positively linked to strengthened obedience 
towards social norms and authorities (Leung, Au, Huang, Kurman, Niit, & Niit, 2007), 
as it is considered an underlying factor of socially conservative worldviews (Bond, 
Leung, Au, Tong, & Chemonges‐Nielson, 2004). Reward for Application may be 
promoting pseudoscientific beliefs along a different pathway than Religiosity and Fate 
Control. People who endorse this social axiom tend to prioritize good social 
relationships over the defence of potentially conflicting ideas, showing heightened 
levels of social conformity and uncritical attitude. Thus, they are prone to 
accommodation as conflict resolution, social desirability, and lack of self-acceptance 
(Singelis, Hubbard, Her, & An, 2003; Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, & Chemonges-Nielson, 
2004; Chen, Bond, & Cheung, 2006). Nevertheless, if Reward for Application works as 
a background during pseudoscientific belief acquisition, then the mechanism should be 
strongly susceptible to being suppressed, or reverted to, if short-term incentives change 
(e.g. Khanna & Sood, 2017). 
Social Complexity and Social Cynicism 
These two social axioms are expected to be unrelated to pseudoscientific beliefs 
and authoritarian attitudes. On one hand, as Social Complexity is positively related to 
cognitive flexibility (Singelis, Hubbard, Her, & An, 2003), problem solving, 
collaboration, self-direction, and openness to change (Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, & 
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Chemonges-Nielson, 2004), these individuals may react in a more open-minded and 
self-affirmed way when presented with information that contradicts their belief system, 
thus promoting flexibility during the assessment of social conventions. On the other 
hand, there are no theoretical reasons to expect a direct association between Social 
Cynicism and pseudoscience — although this social axiom may be related to conspiracy 
theories, as argued in Supplementary Material. 
  
Overview and working hypotheses 
  
We conducted two empirical studies in order to assess the foregoing theoretical 
framework, structured in three working hypotheses: 
H-1 — Pseudoscientific beliefs, religiosity, reward for application, fate control, 
political orientation, and authoritarianism are all positively intercorrelated. 
H-2 — Religiosity, reward for application, fate control, and authoritarianism 
explain the rightward cast of pseudoscience. 
H-3 — The association between authoritarianism and pseudoscientific beliefs is 






Study 1 was designed as an exploratory pilot focused on H-1 and H-2, and so was 
conducted to assess the general likelihood of the mediational model displayed in H-3. 
This preliminary study includes validated scales on general pseudoscientific beliefs, the 
three social axioms hypothesised as related to these beliefs (Reward for Application, 
Religiosity, and Fate Control), and Political Orientation as measured by the right-
wing/left-wing axis. Therefore, Study 1 constituted an informative starting point, 
offering encouraging results that were further replicated and broadened by the thorough 
confirmatory approach of Study 2. 
Sample 
We recruited a sample of 1189 Spanish speakers for an online administration of 
the scales via Google Forms. The respondents were invited to participate using 
Facebook and Twitter, through forums and groups of pseudoscientific believers. In 
addition, we counted on the help of science disseminators and sceptic blogs to increase 
sample’s variability. Given the wide audience of those groups in Spanish-speaking 
social networks, our sample included participants from Spain and Latin America. 228 
(19.2%) were women and 961 (80.8%) were men, with an average age of 39.7 (SD: 
10.2). 248 (20.9%) had pre-university education and 941 (79.1%) a university one. 
Lastly, 170 (14.3%) self-describe religious identification and 1019 (85.7%) do not. 
Measures 
To measure Political Orientation, we included a 10-point Likert scale representing 
the right-wing/left-wing spectrum. To assess pseudoscientific beliefs, we used the 30-
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item Pseudoscientific Belief Scale (Fasce & Picó, 2019a), a reliable measure (α = 0.88)1 
that includes pseudo-theory promotion and science denialism as forms of 
pseudoscience. For the three social axioms included in our model, we used three 8-item 
factors extracted from the Social Axioms Survey II (Leung, Lam, Bond, Conway, 
Gornick, Amponsah, et al., 2012): Reward for Application (α = 0.88), Fate Control (α = 
0.72), and Religiosity (α = 0.85). In addition, we included several measures on need to 




There were significant differences in Sex (t = -4.21, d = 0.34, p < 0.001; more 
Pseudoscientific Beliefs among women), Education (t = 2.31, d = 0.16, p < 0.05; more 
Pseudoscientific Beliefs among subjects with pre-university education), and Religious 
Identity (t = -8.64, d = 0.76, p < 0.001; more Pseudoscientific Beliefs among religious 
subjects). As we did not find significant association between age and pseudoscience, we 
discarded this variable for further analyses. 
H-1 
Regarding the association of the variables tested in Study 1, Pseudoscientific 
Beliefs were positively correlated to right-wing Political Orientation (r = 0.11, p < 
0.001) and to the three social axioms included: Reward for Application (r = 0.20, p < 
 
1 All the Cronbach's alphas reported in this article were calculated using our data matrices. 
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0.001), Religiosity (r = 0.33, p < 0.001) and Fate Control (r = 0.49, p < 0.001). These 
results are displayed in Table 1 and support our first working hypothesis. 
 
Table 1 
Correlation of pseudoscientific beliefs regarding political orientation and social 
axioms. 
 Pseudoscientific Beliefs 
Political Orientation 0.11*** 
Reward for Application 0.20*** 
Religiosity 0.33*** 
Fate Control 0.49*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p< 0.01; ***p<0.001. Values in bold are corrected for multiple 
comparisons by Bonferroni method (p<0.05). All values survived this correction. 
 
H-2 
In order to test H-2, we conducted a hierarchical multiple linear regression with 
Pseudoscientific Beliefs as the dependent variable. In Model 1, we entered the three 
sociodemographic variables with significant differences regarding Pseudoscientific 
Beliefs — namely Sex, Religious Identity, and Education. In Model 2, Reward for 
Application, Religiosity and Fate Control were entered as independent variables. Lastly, 
we entered Political Orientation as an independent variable in Model 3, as we wanted to 
assess its predictive power above social axioms. A multicollinearity test was carried out 
using VIF and tolerance statistics: all the VIF values were below 1.7 and tolerance 
statistics were above 0.59. Additionally, our data showed independence of errors 
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Step 1    
Sex 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
Education -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
Religious 
Identity 
0.28*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
Step 2    
Reward for 
Application 
 0.08*** 0.09*** 
Religiosity   0.12*** 0.12*** 
Fate Control  0.40*** 0.40*** 
Step 3    
Political 
Orientation 
  -0.02 
Note: Sex was coded as 1 = male, 2 = female; Education as 1 = Pre-universitary, 2 = 
Universitary; and Religious Identity as 1 = Non-religious, 2 = Religious. All regression 
coefficients are standardized β. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
  
Model 1 [F(3, 1185) = 48.6, p < 0.001] confirmed the included sociodemographic 
variables as significant predictors of pseudoscience endorsement, explaining 11% of its 
variance. Similarly, Model 2 [F(6, 1182) = 89, p < 0.001] confirmed the three social 
axioms as significant predictors of Pseudoscientific Beliefs over sociodemographic 
characteristics, explaining 31% of its variance. In contrast, where Model 3 [F(7, 1181) = 
76.4, p < 0.001] explains the same amount of Pseudoscientific Beliefs’ variance, 
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Political Orientation added no predictive power over social axioms and, consequently, 
was non-significant as a predictor variable. Therefore, social axioms fully explain the 
positive association between Pseudoscientific Beliefs and right-wing Political 
Orientation. These results endorse Reward for Application, Religiosity and Fate Control 




Study 2 was designed as a follow-up to our exploratory results. This second data 
collection replicated and overcame the limitations of Study 1, by including all the 
variables and relationships displayed in our working hypotheses — two forms of 
unwarranted beliefs (pseudoscience and the paranormal), social axioms in full, political 
orientation, and authoritarianism. Consequently, the comprehensive design of Study 2 
allowed us to perform a full assessment of our working hypotheses. 
Sample 
A convenience sample of 1097 Spanish speakers was recruited using the same 
data collection strategy described in Study 1 for an online fulfilment of the scales. 395 
(36%) were women and 702 (64%) were men, with an average age of 35.5 (SD: 12.5). 
242 (22.01%) had pre-university education and 855 (77.9%) a university one. Lastly, 




Besides Political Orientation and Pseudoscientific Beliefs (α = .90), in this study 
we included the 18-item Aggression-Submission-Conventionalism Scale (α = 0.86; 
Dunwoody & Funke, 2016) to the three factors of authoritarianism: Aggression (α = 
0.88), Submission (α = 0.75), and Conventionalism (α = 0.79). For social axioms we 
used the full 40-item Social Axioms Survey II (Leung, Lam, Bond, Conway, Gornick, 
& Amponsah, et al. 2012). The complete scale includes five subscales: Social Cynicism 
(α = 0.89), Social Complexity (α = 0.69), Reward for Application (α = 0.67), Fate 
Control (α = 0.82) and Religiosity (α = 0.87). Lastly, to assess the extrapolation of other 
closely related types of unwarranted beliefs, we included the 26-item Revised 
Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004), a reliable (α = 0.94) and widely used tool to 
assess paranormal beliefs. 
Results 
Sociodemographic variables 
Following the previous results found in Study 1, Study 2 also revealed significant 
differences in Sex (t = -5.67, d = 0.36, p < 0.001; more Pseudoscientific Beliefs among 
women), Education (t = 4.19, d = 0.46, p < 0.001; more Pseudoscientific Beliefs among 
subjects with pre-university education), and Religious Identity (t = -10.59, d = 0.90, p < 
0.001; more Pseudoscientific Beliefs among religious subjects). 
H-1 
As found in Study 1, and as expected by H-1, Pseudoscientific Beliefs had 
positive correlations with Political Orientation (r = 0.21, p < 0.001), Conventionalism (r 
= 0.28, p < 0.001), Submission (r = 0.16, p < 0.001), Aggression (r = 0.18, p < 0.001), 
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and three social axioms: Reward for Application (r = 0.33, p < 0.001), Religiosity (r = 
0.36, p < 0.001), and Fate Control (r = 0.51, p < 0.001). These results are displayed in 
Table 3 and fully support our first working hypothesis. In addition, we found that the 
complete Aggression-Submission-Conventionalism Scale shows a medium-sized 
positive correlation with Pseudoscientific Beliefs (r = 0.31, p < 0.001). As 
Pseudoscientific Beliefs show no correlation to Social Cynicism and a very week, 
almost non-significant correlation to Social Complexity, we discarded these social 
axioms for further analyses. These latter results were expected based on our literature 
review and working hypotheses. 
 
Table 3 
Correlation of pseudoscientific beliefs regarding political orientation, social axioms, 
and factors of authoritarianism. 
 Pseudoscientific Beliefs 
Political Orientation 0.21*** 
Reward for Application 0.33*** 
Religiosity 0.36*** 
Fate Control 0.51*** 
Social Cynicism 0.06 




Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Values in bold are corrected for multiple 





In order to replicate and extend the results of Study 1 in relation to H-2, we 
conducted a hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis with Pseudoscientific 
Beliefs as the dependent variable. A multicollinearity diagnosis using VIF and tolerance 
statistics was carried out: all the VIF values were below 1.79, whereas tolerance 
statistics were above 0.56. Additionally, our data showed independence of errors 
(Durbin-Watson = 1.76). The relevant sociodemographic variables — Sex, Education, 
and Religious Identity — were included in Model 1. We entered the three factors of 
authoritarianism in Model 2: Conventionalism, Submission, and Aggression. 
Subsequently, we entered Reward for Application, Religiosity and Fate Control as the 
independent variables in Model 3, as we wanted to assess their predictive power above 
authoritarianism. Lastly, Political Orientation was added in Model 4. These results are 
































Step 1     
Sex 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 
Education -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
Religious Identity 0.33*** 0.25*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
Step 2     
Submission  0.06* 0.02 0.02 
Conventionalism  0.14*** 0.06* 0.08** 
Aggression  0.13*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 
Step 3     
Reward for 
Application 
  0.14*** 0.16*** 
Religiosity    0.04 0.05 
Fate Control   0.35*** 0.35*** 
Step 4     
Political 
Orientation 
   -0.08* 
Note: Sex was coded as 1 = male, 2 = female; Education as 1 = Pre-universitary, 2 = 
Universitary; and Religious Identity as 1 = Non-religious, 2 = Religious. All regression 
coefficients are standardized β. *p<0.05; **p<0 .01; ***p<0.001. 
  
As with Study 1, Model 1 confirmed sociodemographic variables as good 
predictors of Pseudoscientific Beliefs [F(3, 1093) = 67.3, p < 0.001]. Model 2 [F(6, 
1090) = 46.4, p < 0.001] confirmed authoritarian factors as significant predictors of 
pseudoscience — although covariates had a particularly strong effect over Submission. 
Model 3 [F(9, 1087) = 65.6, p < 0.001] confirmed our theoretical model as a significant 
predictor of Pseudoscientific Beliefs, explaining 35% of its variance. Furthermore, in 
accordance with Study 1, Model 4 explained the same 35% of Pseudoscientific Beliefs’ 
variance, confirming that Political Orientation has no predictive power above 




In order to test the hypothesised mediational effects of social axioms on the 
relationship between authoritarianism and pseudoscientific beliefs, we carried out a 
series of simple mediational analyses by means of the PROCESS macro (v3.4). 
Mediation analyses are intended to statistically test hypothesised models in which the 
relationship between an independent and dependent variable is thought to be influenced 
by a mediator variable (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). Thus, mediator variables 
explain a causal sequence whereby the independent variable predicts indirectly the 
outcome on the dependent variable — the so-called “indirect effect”. In other words, 
mediation analyses explain how mediating variables intervene in the relationship 












Figure 1. Graphical representation of mediation analyses performed with PROCESS. 
Pseudoscientific Beliefs was selected as dependent variable, authoritarianism as 
independent variable, and social axioms as mediator variables. Note: Values represent 
standardized β. Mediational effects were tested by analysing the “indirect effect” via 
bootstrapping (95% confidence intervals; number of bootstrap samples: 5000). *p<0.05; 
**p<0.01; ***p<0.001. ASC = Authoritarianism (as measured by the Aggression-
Submission-Conventionalism Scale); PSEUDO = Pseudoscientific Beliefs; RFA = 
Reward for Application; REL = Religiosity; FC = Fate Control. 
  
To verify the present hypothesis (H-3), we studied the mediational effects by 
analysing the indirect effect via bootstrapping (95% confidence intervals; number of 
bootstrap samples: 5000), revealing that Reward for Application, Religiosity, and Fate 
Control act as partial mediators between authoritarianism (as measured by the whole 
Aggression-Submission-Conventionalism Scale) and Pseudoscientific Beliefs. All these 
indirect effects — i.e. the total effect minus the direct effect— fully support our third 
working hypothesis (see Figure 1 for a detailed graphical representation). These results 
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do not suggest a univocal causal pathway between authoritarianism, social axioms and 
pseudoscience. Instead, based on our literature review we propose that authoritarian 
predispositions constitute a cognitive substrate that facilitates the endorsement of 
certain social axioms; these, in turn, boost the existing association between 
authoritarianism and unfounded beliefs. Therefore, the observed mediations aid 
understanding of the primary focus of this article: authoritarianism as a motivational 
context in which pseudoscience thrives. 
Extrapolation to other forms of unwarranted beliefs 
We included a validated scale on Paranormal Beliefs to conduct the same analyses 
as those conducted for Pseudoscientific Beliefs. Interestingly, the pattern of 
associations, statistical significances, and effect sizes of Paranormal Beliefs were very 
similar to those found in the previous analyses. These results strongly suggest that 
Paranormal Beliefs are equally related to authoritarianism and partially mediated by the 
same social axioms as pseudoscience. Hence, the mediational model tested in this study 
can be rightfully extrapolated to the paranormal, showing that pseudoscience involves 
strong paranormal content and both groups of believers largely overlap and resemble. 
Results on Paranormal Beliefs and additional remarks on the potential and nuanced 









The data reported in this article show that three social axioms partially mediate 
the existing association between right-wing authoritarianism and pseudoscience. Hence, 
these results fully endorse our hypotheses, being compatible with a theoretical 
interpretation framed within lay epistemic theory. Nevertheless, other forms of 
authoritarianism may be related to specific unwarranted beliefs by means of different 
social conceptions — such as left-wing authoritarianism (Conway, Houck, Gornick, & 
Repke, 2017), subtle forms of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002), 
and even liberal authoritarianism (Babones, 2018). For instance, historical examples 
such as Lysenkoism (Kolchinsky, Kutschera, Hossfeld, & Levit, 2017) and current 
leftist conspiracy theories (e.g. Oliver & Wood, 2014) show that left-wing 
authoritarianism promotes its own forms of disinformation. 
Authoritarianism and social axioms as underlying factors of belief polarisation 
Authoritarian predispositions toward social conservatism boosted by social 
axioms may be explanatory regarding the kind of intergroup struggle that leads to 
motivated belief polarisation among radical minorities. As recent results strongly 
suggest that science rejection is mediated by lack of perceived social consensus between 
experts and the public opinion (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; van der 
Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015; Lewandowsky, Cook, Fay, & Gignac, 
2019), the socio-political profile of pseudoscience described in this study may be 
blocking the perception of expert agreement by reinforcing ingroup conventionalism — 
although more research is needed to confirm this causal pathway. 
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Accordingly, recalcitrant unwarranted believers would be reluctant to accept 
information from the outgroup, particularly due to hyperactive affective anchoring of 
ingroup membership that heightens the perception of intergroup threats and leads to the 
rejection of the open marketplace of ideas. These authoritarian individuals would tend 
to disregard the freedom of expression of the outgroup, avoiding uncertainty by 
endorsing a monopoly of truth (Hackett, Gaffney, & Data, 2018), and preferring instead 
to engage with prototypical, deviant “truth seekers” (e.g. Franks, Bangerter, Bauer, Hall, 
& Noort, 2017) — i.e. fake experts that hold proper badges of ingroup membership. 
These authoritarian motives would lead pseudoscientific believers to exploit their 
analytical thinking in order to rationalise polarisation and partisan science acceptance, 
thus performing backfire-effect. This potential causal chain constitutes a relevant novel 
research line on the underlying social conceptions that give rise to motivated reasoning 
and, consequently, block the public acceptance of science. 
Implications for social interventions and science communication 
The reported association between authoritarianism and pseudoscience suggests 
that ingroup ostracism and conventionalism may be pushing individuals toward a 
consensus-gap. Therefore, the most direct intervention would be to offer conditions to 
improve intergroup contact related to pseudoscientific issues, such as common goals 
and cooperation (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). As a confrontational rhetoric style has been 
proved to backfire under conditions of motivated reasoning, we must place value on 
unregulated free speech, conversations that engage diverse viewpoints, and self-
disclosure, as these attitudes facilitate mutual understanding (e.g. Vescio, Sechrist, & 
Paolucci, 2003; Turner, Hewstone & Voci, 2007). In fact, this is the typical attitude that 
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can be found among those who hold Social Complexity as an interpretation of the social 
world — almost unrelated to pseudoscience and authoritarian attitudes. 
Another line of interventions may be focused on echo-chambers and partisan 
media, as they foster social conceptions associated with pseudoscience, such as group 
bias and, consequently, authoritarian rejection of hostile information. Echo-chambers 
are often exploited by evidence-resistance groups that effectively promote denialism 
and pseudo-theories (Lewandowsky, Pilditch, Madsen, Oreskes, & Risbey, 2019). In 
general terms, it is important to encourage people to counter false-consensus effect and 
harmful intellectual submission by making their voices heard. It would be very helpful 
to expand the boundaries established by social media’ algorithms to expose users to a 
wider spectrum of information, including the authoritative voice of scientists — which 
can participate in the public sphere without risking their credibility (Kotcher, Myers, 
Vraga, Stenhouse, & Maibach, 2017). Hence, it is important for science communication 
to deploy pedagogical strategies and inoculation messages to cope with disinformation 
within corrupted information architectures, making the public aware of how fake news, 
trolling, and filter bubbles work (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 
2012; Cook, Lewandowsky, & Ecker, 2017; Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017). 
In addition, even though scientific literacy and critical thinking are negatively 
correlated to pseudoscience endorsement (Fasce & Picó, 2019b), previous research 
outcomes consistently concluded that courses that promoted a motivational state of 
distrust in pseudoscience produced a reduction of those beliefs, whereas general 
education classes on critical thinking and research methods did not (Dyer & Hall, 2018; 
29 
 
Wilson, 2018)2. So, under the light of these results, efficient interventions on 
pseudoscience endorsement and science communication should include motivational 
strategies to deal with authoritarianism and counterproductive social conceptions, such 
as worldview and values affirmation, in order to exploit the existing negative 
association between trust in science and pseudoscientific beliefs (Ståhla & van Prooijen, 
2018; Fasce & Picó, 2019b). 
Limitations 
We want to remark on some of the limitations of the reported studies. Firstly, 
these results must be taken cautiously, particularly in regard to their interpretation in 
causal terms. These theory-driven correlational results suggest a causal relationship 
between authoritarian attitudes and pseudoscientific beliefs; however, this potential 
pathway needs further experimental confirmation, particularly to identify confounders. 
Secondly, both samples are composed by a higher number of men, more university 
educated and more non-religious subjects — even though the samples’ variabilities 
were acceptable enough to include these sociodemographic variables in further 
analyses. Consequently, these sample asymmetries should be assessed in future studies 




2 We are not suggesting that the public acceptance of science is a process analogous to that of 
pseudoscience. As we have already mentioned, critical thinking disposition, cognitive reflection, and 
basic knowledge about scientific theories are relevant characteristics of successful scientific literacy (e.g. 
Fasce & Picó, 2019b), nevertheless, scientific scepticism also needs motivational and affective 





We have successfully tested a mediational model that characterises 
pseudoscientific beliefs as related to an authoritarian interpretation of society, in which 
three social axioms that place great value on unwarranted beliefs play an explanatory 
role. Hence, the previously reported associations of certain instances of pseudoscience 
with right-wing ideologies may be explicable by means of this richer socio-political 
background, related to the lay epistemic theory. Exacerbated levels of authoritarian 
attitudes may be at the root of motivated reasoning already observed among recalcitrant 
groups of pseudoscientific believers. As such, some strategic interventions could be 
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